This paper analyzes debt maturity structure for borrowers with private information about their future credit rating. Borrowers' projects provide them with rents that they cannot assign to lenders. The optimal maturity structure trades off a preference for short maturity due to expecting their credit rating to improve, against liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the risk that a borrower will lose the nonassignable rents due to excessive liquidation incentives of lenders. Borrowers with high credit ratings prefer short-term debt, and those with somewhat lower ratings prefer long-term debt. Still lower rated borrowers can issue only short-term debt.
news arrives. Liquidity risk is the risk that a solvent but illiquid borrower is unable to obtain refinancing. The model fits this characterization because, even without using their private information, some borrowers who are liquidated would invest their own capital (if it were available) to avoid default. The model characterizes borrowers who are averse to bearing this risk.
The main result is that there is a credit rating such that those with higher ratings prefer short-term debt as a type of "bridge financing" that allows them to choose to refinance when good news arrives, while lower rated borrowers prefer long-term debt. In addition, some very low rated borrowers have no choice but to use short-term debt, despite the control that it gives to lenders. The model thus identifies two categories of short-term borrowers: the low rated who have no choice, and the high rated who use short-term debt to time their borrowing to take advantage of the arrival of information. Borrowers with ratings in between these rely more heavily on long-term debt.
The model measures the borrower's credit rating for a given amount of leverage, and this might alternatively be termed its credit reputation. Another interpretation of the model is of the choice of debt maturity for a leveraged buyout (a recapitalization without outside equity) conducted by incumbent management who have private information about the firm's prospects. Liquidity risk arises from debt that is of shorter maturity than assets. A key determinant of the actual calendar maturity is the timing of cash flows. This paper abstracts from cash flow timing differences and provides a theory of the gap between debt maturity and asset maturity. ' Short maturity debt creates liquidity risk because sometimes the borrower is unable to refinance and the lender liquidates when the borrower would not choose to if he or she were the sole owner of the firm. Short-term lenders liquidate (are unwilling to refinance current management) too often from the borrower's point of view because there are constraints on pledging future rents to lenders: the amount that can be pledged to lenders may be less than the value they receive from liquidation, yet the total future rents exceed the liquidation value. These constraints arise from many possible sources: private information by borrowers, moral hazard, and monitoring costs. These contracting problems imply that 1. The only empirical study I am aware of that looks at this gap is Morris [1989] , but it does not use credit rating data. into the cost of financing. Section V develops a model in which to compare several types of debt contracts. Section VI shows how the borrower's credit rating influences maturity structure choice. Section VII generalizes this to an optimal mix of short-and long-term debt. Section VIII discusses firms whose credit rating is so poor that no one will lend long term. Section IX provides some more general motivation for the existence and magnitude of nonassignable control rents. Section X uses a game-theoretic equilibrium refinement to show that the equilibrium is reasonable. Section XI concludes the paper.
II. THE MODEL
Borrowers have no capital, and each needs to fund an indivisible investment project. The project's ex ante prospects and the ex post cash flows are private information observed only by the borrower. The borrower's project can be liquidated. If it is liquidated, the borrower can be prevented from consuming its current or future cash flows and control rents. In this case, an optimal financial contract is a debt contract enforced by the right to liquidate if the debt is not repaid in full. The only reason I use the assumption of unobservable cash flows is in restricting attention to debt contracts.
Borrowers and lenders are risk neutral. Lenders consume at date 2 and have a constant returns-to-scale investment technology that returns R per unit invested per period. One unit invested at date 0 returns R units at date 1; and if this is invested until date 2, the terminal value is R 2. A borrower with a given credit rating can borrow as long as lenders receive an expected return of R per period, per unit loaned. The model abstracts from unexpected changes in riskless interest rates. One interpretation of this is that the borrower hedges these changes using interest rate futures, options, or swaps. Because borrowers have no private information about future riskless interest rates, they can hedge these risks without revealing any information about themselves.
There are two types of projects, and each borrower has one type of project. The borrower's type is his private information. Both types require $1 in (outside) capital at date 0 and produce cash flows only on date 2 (none on date 1). Each project yields a cash flow of X > 0 when successful, and each project also produces a nonassignable control rent of C if the management has control at date 2.4 All projects can be liquidated at date 1 for L. A successful project yields a higher return when not liquidated, because L < X/R. Liquidation should be broadly interpreted to include other situations where the borrower loses control of the project at date 1 and lenders attempt to capture maximum repayment: see Section IV where moral hazard causes the loss without liquidation. Projects have no liquidating value at date 2. The two types of project differ only in the probability that the return X is received. The two types of borrower are as follows. Type G The project returns a cash flow of X > R2 for sure at date 2. This is a positive net present value project in terms of cash flows. Type B
The project returns a cash flow of X, with probability [I, and returns zero with probability 1 -II. fIX < R2, and the project has a negative net present value in terms of cash flows. Lenders' information about a borrower is the credit rating. As of date 0, it is as follows. A borrower has a credit rating f if lenders assign the borrower a probability f to being type G and 1 -f to being type B. Recall that the borrower knows his or her own type. The lower a borrower's credit rating, the higher is the promised interest rate, due to the higher default rate of type B's. As of date 0, the probability of repayment of a loan maturing on date 2 is: H + f (1 -H).
Additional information about borrowers arrives at date 1. This information is described in the next section.
III. MATURITY STRUCTURE CHOICE: INFORMATION ARRIVAL
Information arrives at date 1 about each borrower. This information arrives privately to lenders and is not verifiable, so contracts written contingent on the information cannot be enforced. If borrowers refinance at date 1, the terms of refinancing will depend on the information, since the credit rating will be either upgraded or downgraded. I assume that there are only two realizations of information at date 1. Denote the credit rating (conditional probability that a borrower is of type G) given an 4. The following generalizations can be made without changing our results. The control rent can differ by type of borrower, it can be risky, and it can be related to the realized cash flow. The control rent can be per period (the rent in the first period is a "sunk benefit" as of date 1).
upgrade by f u, and rating given a downgrade by f d. I assume that f U > f > f d: the probability of being of type G is greater given an upgrade than given a downgrade.
All borrowers receive either an upgrade or a downgrade. For simplicity, I assume that all type B borrowers receive a downgrade, implying that f U = 1 because only type G's ever receive an upgrade. All of my results hold when there is a positive probability of an upgrade of a type B, as long as the probability differs from that of a type G, but this extra parameter is not needed. Let e denote the probability that a type G borrower receives an "erroneous" downgrade (1 -e is the probability of an upgrade for a type G). Because all type B's are downgraded, Bayer's Law implies that e, the probability that a type G borrower receives a downgrade is e =
where fd is the credit rating given a downgrade and f is the initial (date 0) credit rating of the borrower.
A. Maturity Choice
Long-term debt is debt floated at date 0 that matures at date 2, with no refinancing at date 1. The face value p of this debt is set so that lenders who lend $1 get an expected return of R2, realizing that debt is repaid with probability II + f (1 -II). The face value of a long-term bond is given by p = R2[ll + f (1 -ll)P1, if p < X. If p > X, then borrowers with credit rating f cannot borrow long term, because they cannot provide lenders with an expected return of R2.
On date 1 each borrower receives either an upgrade or a downgrade. The information does not influence the face value of long-term debt and does not lead to liquidation because long-term lenders have no such rights, but the information does influence the secondary market value of that debt. The date 1 market value is useful for comparison with the case of short-term debt because it measures the value received by lenders from borrowers who receive upgrades and downgrades. Let Vu and Vd denote the date 1 market value of the long-term debt given, respectively, an upgrade and a downgrade. Given an upgrade, the long-term debt is repaid for sure, and its date 1 market value is Vu = pIR. Given a downgrade, the long-term debt is repaid with probability qd = II + fd(1 _ II), and its date 1 value is Vd = qdp!R.
Short-term debt is debt financed at date 0, maturing on date 1 with face value r1. The date 1 repayment comes either from refinancing at date 1 at interest rates contingent on the realization of date 1 information or from the proceeds of liquidation at that date. Refinanced debt issued at date 1 matures at date 2. Let ru and rd (with no subscript) denote the face value of refinanced shortterm debt that matures on date 2, given, respectively, an upgrade and a downgrade at date 1.
The face value of short-term debt issued at date 1 is set so that given the information about a borrower at that date, lenders at date 1 get an expected return of R per unit invested (e.g., if they invest R, they receive an expected return of R 2). The amount that must be raised at date 1 depends (among other things) on r1, the face value of short-term debt issued at t = 0.
When the borrower cannot repay in full at date 1, the decisions made at that time serve the interests of date 0 short-term lenders, because they have the control rights to force liquidation when they are not paid in full. Suppose that the face value of the refinanced debt at date 1, given a downgrade, is r". The debt issued by downgraded borrowers at date 1 will be repaid at date 2 with probability qd =_ + (1 -Hl)fd (and repays zero with probability 1 qd ). Debt with face value rd raises qdrd/R on date 1. The debt maturing at date 1 can be repaid in full by a new debt issue if qdX/R > r1, because X is the most a borrower can pay. If the maturing debt cannot be repaid in full, lenders choose the resolution that maximizes their repayment. Making a concession to "work out" a default by accepting the maximum that a new debt issue can raise yields qdX/R, while liquidation yields L (and destroys the borrower's control rent). Let the value of date 1 repayment received by date 0 short-term lenders given a downgrade be denoted by Vsd = min[rl, max{L,qdX/R 1].5 Short-term borrowers who receive an upgrade refinance to pay the full face value of their date 0 debt: they pay r1 on date 1, and the value on date 1 of date 0 short-term debt to an upgraded borrower is Vu = r1. This debt maturing at date 2 is repaid with probability 1; the face value of debt issued at date 1 with good news is then ru = r1R. Let pJ be the probability that news j arrives for a borrower of unknown type. Note that pu = (1 -e)f and pd = 1 -pu. affecting the date 1 information contingent payoffs received by lenders. Debt maturity structure influences the date 1 liquidation decision and the face value of refinanced debt at date 1. Before presenting this analysis, the next section illustrates the important issues with a series of numerical examples that show some determinants of the maturity structure preferred by type G borrowers. The maturity preferred by type G's turns out to be offered by all borrowers, because type B's would reveal themselves if they offered another maturity, and they would not be able to borrow.
IV. EXAMPLES OF MATURITY CHOICE WHEN BOTH MATURITIES ARE FEASIBLE
This section presents examples where any short-term debt to be refinanced at date 1 is riskless because liquidation by itself can provide date 0 lenders with a normal rate of return, or L = R. To keep units simple, the examples assume that interest rates are zero, or R = 1. This gives lenders a simple liquidation rule: liquidate whenever the debt is not repaid in full. It implies that the face value of date 0 short-term debt is r1 = 1.
In all examples, I assume the following. The probability of repayment by type B borrowers is 17 = 1/2. The sum of cash flows from successful projects and nonassignable control benefits is X + C = 13/4 (X and C will vary across examples), except in example 1, where X = 13/4 and C is any nonnegative value. At date 1 information about the type of a borrower arrives, and the information has two realizations: conditional on an upgrade in rating, a borrower is known to be type G for sure; fU = 1, where fU is the probability of type G given an upgrade. All type B and some type G borrowers get a downgrade. Conditional on a downgrade in rating, the probability of being a type G borrower is fd = 1/3.
EXAMPLE 1. An example without liquidation.6
Suppose that the date 0 credit rating is f = 1/2 (half the borrowers are type G) and the projects return cash of X = 13/4 when successful. In this example there will be no liquidation, implying that the control rent C is not lost on a downgrade. As a result, the When there is no chance of liquidation destroying control rents, short-term debt is preferred by type G borrowers because it lowers their expected financing costs. Short-term debt lowers a good borrower's expected financing cost because a downgrade that increases a borrower's repayment is less likely for him or her than for an average borrower.
The type G's receive lower financing costs because those who receive downgrades provide lenders with a higher date 1 return given short-term debt, Vd = L = 1, than given long-term debt, Vd = qdp/R = 8/9, and type G's have a lower than average probability of receiving a downgrade. With short-term debt, type G's provide a smaller fraction of the payments to lenders (and type B's a larger fraction) than with long-term debt. Given a date 0 credit rating of f = 3/4 and a rating given downgrade of f d = 1/3, the probability of a type G receiving a downgrade is e = f d(l -f )/( f(l _ f d) = 1/6. A higher rated type G borrower (with f = 3/4) has a lower probability of a given drop in credit rating than a type G borrower with a lower rating (of f = 1/2, 719 in example 2). There is still liquidation given a downgrade. The payoff from issuing short debt is e(O) + (1 -e)(X + C -ru) = 5/6(1.75 -1) = 5/8 which exceeds the 17/28 payoff from issuing long-term debt. Therefore, the higher rated borrower prefers short debt.
As in example 2 the value of short-term lenders' claim on date 1 given a downgrade is greater than long-term lenders' claim given a downgrade, and the control rent of C = 0.35 is destroyed given a downgrade. The higher credit rating as of date 0 ( f = 3/4 instead of 1/2 in example 2) implies that the probability that a type G borrower receives a downgrade (e= 1/6) relative to an average borrower's probability of a downgrade pd = ef + (1 -f ) = 5/8, or e/pd = l/6/8 = 4/15, which exceeds equivalent ratio in examples 1 and 2 was 1/2/3/4 = 5/15. Type G borrowers in example 2 have a credit rating just above that where pledging all cash flows will lead them to lose their financing. These borrowers are the most averse to bearing the liquidity risk of short-term debt because their probability of getting the small downgrade that leads to liquidation need not be much lower than that of type B borrowers. The extra repayment from type B's who receive a downgrade is not sufficient to make the type G's risk loss of their control rents. Conversely, the higher rated type G borrower in example 3 is much less likely than the average high rated borrower to get a very large downgrade. The higher rated type G borrower prefers short-term debt because high debt payments are extracted from liquidating many type B's for each type G that is downgraded and loses control rents in liquidation.
V. COMPARING DEBT STRUCTURES THAT DIFFER BOTH IN INFORMATION AND LIQUIDATION
The maturity of debt that is preferred by type G borrowers is chosen by all borrowers.7 Choosing a maturity that only type B's would prefer would reveal that a borrower was of type B, and then no loan would be made. Section X discusses the borrower beliefs that support this outcome. I analyze the preferred maturity structure of type G borrowers, but this should be interpreted as the 7. Type B borrowers would always prefer long-term debt, if the choice did not reveal information. However, when type G borrowers prefer short-term debt, the choice of long-term debt would reveal that a borrower was type B, with negative net present value projects, and no one would lend to a revealed type B. maturity offered by all borrowers with the same date 0 credit rating as the type G borrower analyzed.
The examples in the last section illustrate how debt maturity influences the impact of date 1 information on financing costs, liquidation decisions, and the value of lenders' claims. To provide a framework to develop these ideas, this section examines the preferences of type G borrowers for arbitrary contracts that differ in the date 1 value of lenders' claims (Vd and VU), and possibly differing date 1 liquidation decisions contingent on downgrade. This result is then applied to the analysis of several classes of debt contracts. Recall that the date 1 value of lenders' claims given a downgrade, Vd, is always higher for short-term debt than for long-term, because either the face value of the debt is increased, or there is liquidation that yields more than increasing the face value. Proof. See Appendix.
The idea behind Lemma 1 is simple. When the liquidation decision is not affected, increasing the payment by those who get a downgrade lowers the expected financing costs of type G borrowers who are less likely than average to get a downgrade. Lemma 2 characterizes the trade-off between extracting larger payments from those who are downgraded versus losing control rents in liquidation. The lemma ranks debt structures from the point of view of type G borrowers. LEMMA 2. Comparing a debt structure that does not imply liquidation and that implies a value of debt claim given a downgrade of Vd, and an alternative debt structure that implies liquidation given a downgrade, type G borrowers prefer the debt structure that implies liquidation if and only if C < C: the control rent is less than or equal to a positive bound C > 0, Probability that a borrower is of type G, given a downgrade at date 1. f [ = Probability that a borrower is of type G, given an upgrade at date 1 ( f = 1). II = Probability that a type B borrower repays at date 2 (probability that the project is successful). Proof. See Appendix.
Consider the conditions where low rated type G borrowers prefer long-term debt. These require liquidation and liquidity risk: L < [qdX + f dC]/R implying that liquidation occurs only because the control rent cannot be pledged. The control rent is lost in liquidation, and liquidation yields lenders smaller proceeds than the cost to type G borrowers. A date 0 credit rating f, only a small amount above the downgrade credit ratingf d, implies that a type G is only slightly less likely than an average borrower to receive a downgrade. If a type G borrower is only slightly less likely than an average borrower to receive a downgrade, the loss of the control rent on downgrade makes the borrower unwilling to borrow short term. A type G borrower with a date 0 rating f well above f d must have a much smaller than average chance of a downgrade. If the credit rating given a downgrade, f d, is low, and if the control rent C is not too large, then a higher rated type G borrower will prefer short-term debt despite some expected loss of control rents.
These ideas are fairly general and do not depend on there being two realizations of new information. For a large enough downgrade the probability of a good borrower receiving the downgrade must be much less than the average borrower (otherwise the large drop in conditional probability of being good could not occur). Good borrowers are not averse to liquidation given large downgrades, even if they lose control rents in these liquidations because most of those being liquidated will be other types of borrower. For a sufficiently high rated borrower, it will require a large downgrade for liquidation (or other control loss) to occur. Such high rated borrowers are not averse to liquidity risk: a small downgrade will not lead to liquidation, and liquidation will be desired given a large downgrade. Lower rated borrowers, who would lose control given a comparatively small downgrade, would be averse to the large liquidity risk of short-term debt.
VII. THE OPTIMAL MIX OF SHORT-AND LONG-TERM DEBT
The model can be generalized to accommodate simultaneous issue of short-and long-term debt. In cases where the optimal choice between the two maturities is long-term debt, the choice of an appropriate maturity mix allows good borrowers to receive some of the benefit from the good news they anticipate, without incurring the liquidity risk.8 The optimal maturity mix will trade off reduced liquidity risk against increased sensitivity of financing cost to new information.
The choice of optimal maturity mix is analyzed in two steps. The first determines the action of short-term lenders that is preferred as of date 0 by type G borrowers. The second determines a maturity mix that provides lenders an incentive to take the preferred action. The lender action in question is at date 1 given bad news. Lenders either leave management in control, or they liquidate. With all long-term debt management retains control. With all short-term debt a lender's action maximizes lender wealth, which may not be the action that maximizes the borrower's ex ante welfare. Type G borrowers desire the largest possible value of Vd, the value of the amount received by lenders from borrowers who get a downgrade, when there is not liquidation. This requires that the face value of date 2 debt given downgrade be at its maximum value X, implying that Vd = qdX/R. A type G's preferred liquidation decision as of date 0 is determined by a trade-off between the loss of control rents when the borrower is liquidated given a downgrade, versus the extraction of higher repayment from borrowers who are liquidated given a downgrade. Lemma 3 provides the conditions for type G ex ante value to be maximized by liquidation given a downgrade, as opposed to a refinancing with total face value of debt equal to X. LEMMA 3. Type G borrowers prefer liquidation given a downgrade to refinancing with face value X, iff f d, the rating given a 8. More generally, priority as well as maturity would need to be studied. In our model, however, the maximum amount that can be repaid is X whenever it is not 0. This leaves very little role for differing priority. Priority turns out not to matter for the problem posed here. See Diamond [1990] for a generalization that analyzes optimal debt priority. which is increasing in the rating f. If the rating given a downgrade is sufficiently low (fd < 1) or liquidity risk is absent (fd > X), then borrowers prefer all short-term debt.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 describe a maturity mix that 9. The downgrade credit rating fd, (the probability of being type G given a downgrade), is the ratio of a type G probability of a downgrade to the probability of downgrade by an average borrower. The numerator of both I and X, LR -fIX, is the increase in repayment that type B downgraded borrowers make when liquidated versus refinancing and repaying face value X, with probability 11. The denominator of P is the net lost rents of a liquidated type G: the total rents (X + C) from a type G project, minus what a downgraded type B borrower pays when not liquidated. The denominator of X is identical, except it neglects the lost control rents C, which are not available to lenders.
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assures that short-term lenders' actions maximize the ex ante value of type G borrowers. This mix will be offered by all borrowers, supported by the reasonable beliefs that a higher fraction of long-term debt would be offered only by type B borrowers, and that no new information is revealed by a lower fraction. The results are similar to Proposition 1: borrowers with better credit ratings (higher f ) choose a higher fraction of short-term debt. This shorter average maturity is desired because it yields higher sensitivity of financing cost to new information, without leading to liquidation because higher rated borrowers must have a larger fall in credit rating for control to be lost with a given maturity structure.
Another contract similar to the mix of long and short debt described in Proposition 2 is a resettable rate bond that is sometimes used in leveraged buyouts. The interest rate is reset (often in an auction) after the bonds have been outstanding for some period, to attempt to make the bonds trade at par in the secondary market. If the credit rating falls, the interest rate must be increased, and vice versa. If there is no rate that will make the bonds trade at par (or if a binding ceiling rate is specified), this is equivalent to short-term bonds that cannot be repaid in full. Some resettable bonds do not put the firm into bankruptcy or give other control rights to lenders if this occurs, implying sensitivity of the cost of capital to new information, but without the risk of lost control rents.
Maturity (and more generally priority) of debt needs to be designed to take account of the differing workout incentives of borrowers and lenders, and possibly, the differing qualities of information of various groups of lenders. The long-term lenders do not need the information possessed by short-term lenders. Because the initiation of workout decisions is the domain of informed short-term lenders, choosing the proper contract structure can provide them with the proper incentives to determine the type of resolution of potential defaults. This argument suggests that commercial bank loans (loans from informed lenders) would optimally be relatively short maturity, and that public debt (uninformed) would be long-term financing. The long-term debt would not play an active role in workout decisions except near its maturity.
VIII. INABILITY TO BORROW LONG TERM
Most of our analysis focuses on credit ratings good enough so both long-and short-term debt are possible. Long-term debt is not 727 possible given credit rating f if and only if p > X, which is equivalent to f < [R' -FIX]/[1 -II]. Short-term debt is always possible when long-term debt is possible, because when there is a default, lenders always choose a debt restructuring at date 1 that maximizes their proceeds, and setting the face value of date 0 short-term debt equal to r, = X/R would yield at least as high a return as long-term debt. Short-term debt is feasible for some credit ratings when long-term is not only if lenders can obtain sufficiently high returns from liquidation given bad news. This requires that the liquidation value L exceed the maximum date 1 value without liquidation, qdXIR. Lemma 4 provides the minimum credit ratings needed to issue both short-and long-term debt. The low rated borrowers who are forced to use short-term debt have a substantial probability of loss of control rents in liquidation, but the higher payment from this liquidation is needed to provide lenders a large enough return for them to lend.
The prediction of short-term debt issued directly to the public by those with bad credit ratings has little empirical support. The low rated borrowers choose short-term debt because the returns in liquidation are a large part of the return received by borrowers. If one takes account of the lower costs of arranging a total or partial liquidation when a loan is a private placement or bank loan, then the model suggests that the low rated borrowers choose short-term privately placed debt, and the high rated borrowers choose shortterm commercial paper, with the intermediate ratings issuing long-term publicly traded bonds. This is certainly not a welldeveloped study of the role of financial intermediaries and corporate debt maturity structure, but it simply suggests that the low rated borrower who is forced to choose short-term debt can be matched with the data by adding some workout cost advantages of intermediaries, as in Diamond [1984] . Either costly monitoring or some punishment such as the possible inefficient liquidation of the borrower's project must follow from a low repayment, or all repayments will be low. For a sufficiently high repayment the monitoring or liquidation is avoided. The higher the probability that realized cash flows in a period fall below this level, the higher are the expected costs or ex post inefficiencies associated with financing the project. High enough costs can prevent the financing of a project that would be worth undertaking if returns were fully observable. These returns in the upper tail of the distribution cannot be assigned to lenders, and play a role identical to the control rent in the model analyzed in the text.
Moral hazard imposes an important limit on rent pledging, because it gives rise to a notion of "debt capacity," with a cost of reduced productive efficiency (lost rents) if the capacity is exceeded.10 This effect is worth illustrating. Assume that control rents are zero, but that type G borrowers have a privately observed choice at date 1 between a safe project that returns G at date 2 for sure, and a risky negative net present value one that returns B > G with probability II < R2/B < 1, and returns zero with probability 1 -H. The type G borrower's choice depends on the face value of debt at date 2, which depends on the information at dates 0 and 1. Type B borrowers have only the risky project. Let p be the date 2 face value of debt. The type G's date 2 return from selecting the safe project is G -p, the return from the risky project is H(B -p), implying that safe projects are selected if and only if p < (G -JJB)/(1 -H) X. The number X is the "debt capacity"; if this face value is exceeded, then type G borrowers will select the risky project with lower net present value, destroying rents of G -HB. This moral hazard model is identical to the situation in the text, except that the debt capacity X is now the limit on assignable cash flow (instead of X), the rent lost on a downgrade is now G -[lB (instead of C), and the probability of debt repayment is qd if face value does not exceed X (and II if it exceeds X).` Note that the lost rents in this example do not occur in liquidation, but in a "workout" (outside of bankruptcy) that assigns more cash rents to lenders. Therefore, the liquidity risk of refinancing short-term debt is not just risk of liquidation, but more generally risk of lost control rents.
X. LENDERS' BELIEFS ABOUT BORROWER TYPE BY CONTRACT CHOSEN
This (somewhat technical) section describes the inferences that lenders make from off-equilibrium path actions that support the equilibrium analyzed above, and presents another (uninteresting) equilibrium where no one ever borrows long term. My goal in this section is to demonstrate that the equilibrium studied above in reasonable.
The equilibrium analyzed has all borrowers choosing the least cost form of debt for a good borrower (a type G), where the good borrower makes the choice using a calculation assuming that both long-and short-term debt are available, with both types of debt evaluated using the credit rating f of a borrower, rather than some complicated inference about the type as a function of the choice made. I refer to this equilibrium as the cost-minimizing equilibrium. This is supported by the following beliefs of lenders. If the calculation indicates that short-term debt is cheaper for G's, then offering long-term is interpreted as indicating that a borrower is of type B, to whom no one would lend. If the calculation indicates that G's prefer long term, then lenders place no stigma on offering long-term debt. The inference drawn from the off-equilibrium action of offering short-term debt is that the borrower is of type G with probability f (note that any lower probability of being of type G would also assure that short term is off-equilibrium in this case).
An off-equilibrium action is the choice of a maturity that no one offers. It is important to make sure that a given maturity is not off-equilibrium only because lenders are anticipated to make an unreasonable inference from its selection. The criterion I use to rule out unreasonable inferences of lenders from off-equilibrium actions is the equilibrium dominance criterion of Cho and Kreps [1987] , that rules out inferences from off-equilibrium actions that imply some type took an action that makes it worse off than its equilibrium action.
LEMMA 5. The cost-minimizing equilibrium analyzed in the text satisfies the Cho and Kreps equilibrium domination criterion. Another equilibrium that satisfies the criterion is for borrowers of all credit ratings to issue only short-term debt. No separating equilibrium exists.
The equilibrium where all borrowers borrow with an identical maturity, even though it is not cost minimizing, is less interesting because it has no cross-sectional predictions about maturity structure. It is supported by the belief that only type B borrowers would borrow at the off-equilibrium maturity, and is analogous to an autarchy equilibrium in a model of trade, where no one produces goods for other than their own consumption because all expect others to do the same, and all anticipate no trade possibilities.
In the cost-minimizing equilibrium, if liquidity risk is sufficiently large, type G borrowers (and all others) choose long-term debt because the saving of interest in the initial round of shortterm borrowing is insufficient to offset the risk of lost future rents.
XI. CONCLUSION
Financing with large amounts of debt of shorter maturity than the cash flows from investments gives substantial control to lenders because the borrower can pay off the old debt only by issuing new debt. If the old debt cannot be repaid in full, lenders have the right to liquidate or take control in some other fashion. Limited ability to assign future cash flows and control rents to lenders implies that they liquidate in too many circumstances. If there is no limit to assigning future rents to outside lenders, short-term debt is preferred by borrowers whose private information is favorable, and this forces other borrowers to choose short-term debt to avoid appearing to have bad news. When it is impossible to contractually assign all future rents, then there is a liquidity risk that limits the use of short-term debt by borrowers who have private good news. The risk of loss of control rents that cannot be assigned to lenders makes good borrowers choose long-term debt, even though they expect the average news about them to be more favorable than average at the time of refinancing. For a borrower with a sufficiently good credit rating, this liquidity risk is outweighed by the effect of expecting future news to be favorable. For borrowers with lower ratings, the liquidity risk outweighs the information effect. There is a minimum rating such that the benefits of short-term debt are worth the liquidity risk. However, very low rated borrowers may have no choice but to choose short-term debt, despite the incentives for inefficient liquidation that it gives to lenders.
The two types of borrowers that choose primarily short-term debt imply that the chosen debt maturity is not a monotonic function of the borrower's credit rating. If the model of this paper captures an important part of the debt maturity decision, empirical studies of maturity will measure a mixture of two effects. This could make inferences complicated. One way around this would be to use short-term bank debt as a proxy for the low rated borrowers who must choose short-term debt, and directly placed commercial paper as the proxy for the borrowers who choose short-term debt given the alternative of long-term debt. It is also important to remember that the model holds the amount of leverage constant by ruling out equity. A firm with little total debt would be unlikely to lose control due to inability to repay the debt, independent of the maturity. This suggests that highly leveraged firms would choose longer term debt. Heterogeneous amounts of leverage introduce another complication: the credit rating reported by the rating agencies is the rating on a firm's bonds, and the rating is a decreasing function of leverage. Similarly, the rating on a firm's debt of a given maturity is a decreasing function of the amount of debt at that maturity.
A general implication of borrowers' having private information is that there is a bias toward short-term debt because there can be a stigma associated with long-term debt. This implies that the expected lost control rents from excessive liquidation are not minimized. In addition, the cost of short-term debt is not a fixed cost similar to a transaction cost. Adding a fixed cost to short-term debt (instead of liquidity risk) would imply that those borrowers who were most underrated in the market would be the most willing to select short-term debt and incur the cost. The most underrated good borrowers are those with the lowest rating, implying that a fixed cost of short-term debt would lead the low rated to choose short-term and the high rated to choose long-term. The cost imposed by liquidity risk is largest for liquidation due to small defaults, and is small for large defaults. In addition, the cost is only incurred if there is a default and liquidation. This implies that it is the high rated borrowers who are willing to bear the liquidity risk of refinancing short maturity debt. rd. The constraint that implies that control is retained is rd + p < X; i.e., the date 0 short debt is riskless. If r, < qd(X -p), the short-term debt is riskless, and the short-term lender cannot remove control. If a fraction a of the initial debt is (riskless) short term, then its face value is r = a/IR, and the face value of short-term debt issued at date 1 (to raise r1 and fully repay the initial short-term debt) when there is a downgrade is rd = iR2/(ll + (1 -fl)fd). The fraction 1 -a of long-term debt has face value p = (1 -a)R2/(ll + (1 -H) An improved credit rating implies a greater fraction of short-term debt. A sufficiently good credit rating implies all short-term maturity structure.
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 5
The Cho-Kreps criterion rules out predictions of optimal lender actions that would require lender inferences of the following form: the inclusion of a type in the group of borrowers believed to deviate to the off-equilibrium action when that type would be worse off than in equilibrium if lenders select a best response to a type distribution of borrowers that excluded that type. It rules out situations where a given type of borrower could explain a deviation to another maturity by noting that the other type would have no incentive to deviate if the lender interpreted the deviation as indicating the given type, but the other type could make no such claim. For example, if short-term debt is off-equilibrium and this must be supported by beliefs that offering short-term debt indicates some possibility of being type B, then this is unreasonable if type B's would not select the deviation (would prefer the equilib-rium where all offer long term) if deviation to short were interpreted as indicating type G for sure.
Whenever short-term debt is off the equilibrium path, it is supported by the belief that the implication of short term is a probability of type G of f, thus both types are included. For a type to deviate to short term, a higher conditional probability of being of type G would be required, thus there can be no deviations interpreted as indicating type B for sure. If a deviation is interpreted as indicating type G for sure, then the information that will arrive at time 1 is superfluous, and for both long-and short-term debt the final date 2 face value will be R. In this case, both types would want to deviate, implying that the belief that probability of being type G off passes the Cho-Kreps test.
If only a subset of borrowers prefer long-term debt, it must be the type B's who prefer it, because the news on date 1 is unfavorable for type B's, and favorable for G's (and the liquidity risk of short-term debt is weakly larger for B's). This implies that there are no separating sequential equilibria.
The only other type of equilibrium is one where a single maturity is always offered, independent of credit rating. This passes the Cho-Kreps test, supported by the belief that the off-equilibrium maturity implies that type is certainly B. This passes the Cho-Kreps test because both types would prefer to deviate to the off-equilibrium action if interpreted as type G for sure.
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